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Abstract 
 This essay will discuss a shift taking place within the Chinese environmental movement. 
The work of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations, the established face of the 
movement, has been characterized by efforts to work within the constraints set by the 
government. The emergence of confrontational protests led by members of the middle class 
represents a shift in the movement as a whole. These protests have emerged as the result of the 
growing level of middle class environmental consciousness and the government’s inadequate 
response to environmental problems. This is reflected in citizens’ frustration over the lack of 
government transparency and public consultation. While protests can be perceived as a threat to 
the careful organizational and methodical strategies of ENGOs, both have a role to play in the 
fight against China’s pollution and environmental degradation. 
Introduction 
“Taiwan’s Chen Yu-hao and the Xianglu Group have begun construction on a PX 
chemical project in Haicang. Once this highly toxic chemical goes into 
production, it will mean that an atomic time bomb has been released on Xiamen 
Island. Xiamen people will have to live their lives with leukemia and with 
children born with congenital defects. We want life, we want good health! 
International organizations have determined that this sort of special project should 
only be developed 100 kilometres or more outside a city, but Xiamen is only 16 
kilometres from the project at farthest. For the sake of our future generations, 
please act!”  1
For the past two decades, China’s Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(ENGOs) have acted as the face of the country’s environmental movement. These groups have 
survived not only by adapting and responding to the Chinese state, but also through the use of a 
specific set of strategies. For the most part, these strategies have been of a non-confrontational 
nature, creating an “embedded environmentalism.”   However, recent popular protests involving 2
significant numbers of middle-class Chinese run contrary to the methods by which ENGOs rose 
to prominence. While they share certain characteristics, the very nature of public protest stands 
in stark contrast to the careful activism of ENGOs. This shift is the result of greater 
environmental awareness by the Chinese public and the deficiencies in the government’s 
response to environmental issues. The efforts of this newly emerging branch of the Chinese 
environmental movement have met with some success, and this has led ENGO leaders to 
question their methods.  ENGOs have become somewhat more willing to challenge the 3
government over time, but rarely through such extreme and direct means. 
 In an effort to illustrate the shift taking place within Chinese environmentalism, the first 
part of this paper will discuss the factors that contributed to the rise and success of ENGOs, the 
traditional leaders of the Chinese environmental movement. The decentralization of the Chinese 
state contributed significantly to the initial emergence of ENGOs, as the government began to 
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realize the potential benefits of a functioning civil society. ENGOs and their leaders also selected 
their issues carefully, used the media effectively, established vital networks, cooperated with 
international NGOs and, more recently, began to use the courts to their advantage. Discussion 
will be limited to true NGOs, to the exclusion of Government Organized Non-Governmental 
Organizations (GONGOs).  The second part of this paper will examine recent high-profile 4
instances of Chinese environmental protest, revealing the ways that this kind of popular 
participation represents a significant departure from the efforts of ENGOs. Information on these 
protests was gathered from articles found through the online news site China Digital Times.  5
Factors Contributing to the Rise and Success of ENGOs 
Decentralization as a Catalyst for NGO Growth 
The Chinese government’s late 20th century decentralization provided NGOs with an 
opportunity to emerge and grow by filling roles once held by the state. As part of the dismantling 
of the infamous “iron rice bowl,” the country’s leaders sought to divest themselves of previous 
responsibilities and social burdens. The state had become dominant in so many different areas of 
Chinese society that when it began to retreat, replacements were needed to provide services and 
fill roles previously held by the government.  It was the hope of the state that civil society could 6
address the areas into which the state had previously overextended itself. One area that gradually 
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received more and more concern was environmental degradation. The early 1990s saw “a 
gradual shift in the government’s commitment from ‘co-ordinated development,’ with explicit 
priority given to economic development, to one of ‘sustainable development.’”  In The River 7
Runs Black, Elizabeth Economy argues that “by promoting the growth of environmental NGOs 
and media coverage of environmental issues, the Chinese leadership hopes to fill the gap 
between its desire to improve the country’s environment and its capacity to do so.”  Peter Ho 8
presents statistics that show the rapid rise of environmental organizations during the 1990s, 
which he attributes to both a shared notion of environmental responsibility and the desire to 
make up for the government’s shortfalls.  He argues that the nature of Chinese environmentalism 9
is the result of two factors, (1) the simultaneous emergence of environmental NGOs in China and 
what he refers to as the “greening” of the Chinese state, and (2) the state’s “toleration and strict 
control” over NGOs and other social groups.  Providing a certain amount of support for ENGOs 10
does confer some advantages. As part of its larger goal of reducing pollution, the government can 
utilize ENGOs as “an inexpensive mechanism for monitoring local pollution efforts and 
educating the public on environmental protection.”  This is one example of how the interests of 11
the Chinese government and the interests of social organizations can be aligned. 
While China’s leaders have to some degree facilitated the growth of these groups, they 
have also been reluctant to support them fully or to follow through with the implementation of 
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tough environmental policies for fear of social unrest. Working with ENGOs can potentially 
address environmental issues while preserving stability. The government is proceeding with 
caution, which is understandable given the past example of the Soviet Union’s experience with 
civil society. From 1995-1997, the Chinese leadership halted all NGO registration, and in 1998 it 
presented new regulations for NGOs.  Today’s regulations are intended to take advantage of 12
what ENGOs have to offer, while at the same time maintaining some level of control.  This is a 13
prime example of the way in which the government is trying to keep these organizations in 
check. But as Ho points out, Chinese government policies that exist to control social groups are 
seemingly ineffective. Although NGOs must find an institution that will sponsor them in order to 
register, many of them are able to register with institutions that simply disguise their work, 
making them essentially invisible to the state.  Jiang Ru and Leonard Ortolano also note the 14
gains from the changes in the structure of China’s political opportunities.  First, when the state 15
instituted registration requirements in an effort to control social groups, it required legal 
recognition by the Chinese state. Legal recognition allowed social groups to open bank accounts, 
prepare legal documents, and perform other such activities.  Second, because of limited 16
resources, the Ministry of Civil Affairs is unable to mount any challenge to many unregistered 
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ENGOs, allowing them to continue their work unaffected.  Over time, the government’s efforts 17
have developed into a real set of laws and multiple levels of enforcement agencies intended to 
address environmental issues and manage social groups. Officials voice their support for social 
organizations, but a give and take has ensued, resulting in confusion over where the boundaries 
for the actions of NGOs truly lie. This means that ENGOs must utilize a specific set of strategies 
designed to work within the bounds of the Chinese state. 
Importance of Issue Selection 
An invaluable tactic in the rise of China’s ENGOs has been careful issue selection by 
organization leaders. Liang Congjie’s famous ENGO, Friends of Nature, helped pave the way for 
the efforts of future groups. One of the most important lessons to be learned from Friends of 
Nature is that in Chinese environmentalism, choosing your battles is key. Congjie’s early 
endeavors concerned issues that were perceived as “politically safe,” such as the effort to save 
the Tibetan antelope.  Friends of Nature was also involved in many innocuous activities such as 18
garbage collection and tree planting. Examples of other activities undertaken by ENGOs include 
“public lectures, workshops and conferences, salon discussions, field trips, publication of 
newsletters and multimedia documents, and new forms of ‘electronic action’ such as online 
discussions, online mailing lists and internet petitions.”  19
Friends of Nature provides us with a good example of what Ru and Ortolano call 
cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation refers to an awareness by Chinese environmentalists 
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that they could advance environmental causes by working together on projects that did not 
directly confront the government.  This is a consistent theme that has played out in the context 20
of individual organizations as well as in the ENGO movement as a whole. Friends of Nature is 
just one example of an ENGO that survived the early days by shying away from pushing 
boundaries. This has given Friends of Nature some semblance of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
state, which today allows the organization to take stances on more contentious issues like dam 
construction on the Nu River.  More broadly, the efforts of groups like Friends of Nature have 21
created a space for other ENGOs to work towards goals within the bounds of government 
regulations. Today, ENGOs are involved in policy discussions and even implementation of 
environmental programs.  22
Media Usage 
 Over the course of the relatively short history of Chinese ENGOs, the media has proven 
to be a valuable partner. Radio and television are important sources of environmental education 
for the Chinese public, and journalists and other personalities have lead successful environmental 
campaigns. Television in particular has been a successful means of spreading the word about 
individual instances of crimes against the environment.  Shapiro makes some important 23
comments regarding ENGO and media convergence. In an effort to describe and categorize the 
ways that these groups do their work, she uses a model of NGO engagement that divides political 
 Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” 155.20
 Andrew Mertha, “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The 21
China Quarterly 200 (2009), 995-1012.
 Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” 157.22
 Economy, The River Runs Black, 163.23
participation into three categories: information, accountability, and symbolism.  When ENGOs 24
use information politics, they gather information such as surveys and scientific research, and 
then distribute it using traditional or new media. Accountability politics refers to efforts by 
ENGOs to hold both the public and private sector accountable for adhering to previous 
commitments, treaties, mission statements, or codes of conduct.  Symbolic politics attempts to 25
change behavior or incite opposition through the use of striking images. Over time, ENGOs such 
as Friends of Nature have gained the confidence to work with the media on issues of 
accountability. This is a particularly dangerous pursuit, as it involves pointing out the missteps of 
the Chinese state. ENGOs work to carefully exploit divisions between the higher and lower 
levels of the state, often drawing the attention of higher officials to local and provincial 
environmental issues. Chongqing Global Village provides a good example of effective media 
usage. The organization was initially focused on awareness and tree planting, but was eventually 
able to curb illegal logging.  There are a few areas where environmental leaders and the media 26
show an especially strong convergence. Writers and editors further the work of ENGOs by 
publishing provocative environmental stories both online and in print.  In addition, ENGO 27
leaders and other environmentalists are frequent guests on Chinese television.  Many of these 28
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organizers got their start as journalists, exposing the environmental disasters that they would 
later work to combat.  29
 Developments in the relationship between the government and the media have also 
benefitted ENGOs. While media outlets are in theory the organs of the state, they are no longer 
under the level of direct control that they once were. In addition, the government has also used 
the media to promote its own environmental campaigns. These two developments, along with the 
fact that many ENGO leaders are current or former members of the media, have allowed 
environmental organizations to take full advantage of the media’s ability to disseminate 
information.  30
Establishment of Networks 
The establishment and effective use of networks is one of the ways that ENGOs attempt 
to overcome the controls instituted by the state. There are three kinds of networks at play: 
networks between ENGOs and officials, between ENGOs and other ENGOs and between 
ENGOs and protective organizations. One of the ways that ENGOs exert influence on policy is 
through their connections to officials at different levels of government and the party. These 
networks rely on the Chinese concept of guanxi, which refers to the personal connections and 
relationships that are crucially important in contemporary China. Informal ties created through 
the exchange of favors and gifts connect activists to members of the state and party, affording 
them additional resources to accomplish their goals. As Tang and Zhan report, ENGOs with 
leadership that includes current or former officials, use their connections to local governments to 
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influence the policy process.  For this reason, Ho and Edmonds believe that environmental 31
activism cannot operate without the state or party. This is another illustration of the embedded 
nature of Chinese environmentalism.  32
A second form of network is that which links ENGOs with each other. Ru and Ortolano’s 
concept of indigenous organizational strength refers to environmental volunteers, ENGO leaders, 
and the networks that link them together.  This is key to ENGO development, and it is one of 33
the ways that group leaders are able to stretch the boundaries for behavior established by the 
government without technically going against official policy. Although the government prohibits 
the establishment of branch offices, individuals are often trained by ENGOs in Beijing before 
founding their own provincial or local-level organizations in other parts of the country.  This is a 34
perfect example of a clever tactic that allows groups to do their work without explicitly opposing 
the state. The founders of some of China’s most influential ENGOs are connected through 
volunteerism and support networks, allowing them to communicate and share best practices.   35
The third form of network exists between ENGOs and protective organizations, which 
can take different forms. As previously discussed, ENGOs must create a link with a sponsoring 
organization in order to register with the government. This sponsoring organization sometimes 
becomes part of the network that the ENGO uses to pursue its aims. This type of network can 
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also be more informal. Friends of Nature was able to successfully use its connections to the 
Communist Youth League as a cover to complete its activities.   36
Influence of International NGOs 
 International NGOs play an important role in supporting China’s ENGOs. They can in a 
sense be considered an extension of the domestic organization and activist network, providing 
both strategies and resources, monetary and otherwise.  Groups such as the World Wide Fund 37
for Nature, Conservation International, and the Nature Conservancy all undertake environmental 
conservation projects in China. Conservation International in particular is seen as a “networker 
and facilitator,” as well as a source of education for urban consumers.  International NGOs are 38
also useful for making connections between groups on issues that transcend borders. In an effort 
to oppose dam construction on the Nu (Salween) river, International Rivers worked with NGOs 
in Myanmar, Thailand, and China.  39
International groups contribute to the work of ENGOs in a number of diverse ways. The 
aforementioned Friends of Nature was created as a result of information learned at a UN 
conference, using methods modeled on a German NGO. Some ENGO founders work first with 
other groups abroad before establishing their own operations in China. On the other hand, some 
activists work with outside groups operating domestically before founding their own 
organizations. Some international groups provide direct financial support for programs in China. 
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Foreign NGOs also provide training for Chinese activists. One example of this is the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) program, which trains 
development and environmental leaders. International and domestic NGOs form a symbiotic 
relationship: outside groups are able to use domestic groups as an entry point to a country whose 
large environmental impact makes it a prime target, while domestic groups use partnerships with 
outside groups as a source of legitimacy.  40
Use of the Courts 
 Although China’s legal system is still relatively underdeveloped, ENGOs have begun to 
use it to some effect. One well-known group, the Center For Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims, is notable for doing just that. Since its start in 1998, it has successfully argued hundreds 
of cases for those who have suffered from the harmful effects of pollution. The organization has 
survived partially because of its host institution’s links to the central government and the high 
international profile of its founder, Wang Canfa.  A partnership with the Vermont Law School 41
also contributes to its legitimacy.  While China’s legal system and the groups that operate within 42
it have a long way to go, the Center is worth noting in the context of this article as example of an 
effort to work within the constraints of the Chinese government to accomplish environmental 
protection goals. 
 ENGOs in China face significant obstacles to accomplishing their goals. These obstacles 
are in most cases created by the government as part of an effort to maintain control and stability. 
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However, by shrewdly taking advantage of the political situation and utilizing a specific set of 
strategies, they have been able to work towards a variety of environmental goals. This careful 
method of change is being challenged by large-scale environmental protests led by China’s 
emerging middle class. 
The Emergence of Environmental Protests 
 Recent environmental protests represent a shift in the Chinese environmental movement. 
While ENGOs have traditionally sought a place within the state’s “consultative authoritarianism” 
as a means of furthering their goals, the protests in question have confronted the government in a 
much more direct fashion.  To some degree, the growth of environmental protests is tied to the 43
growth of ENGOs. The same process of economic and political reform that resulted in 
decentralization and the growth of civil society also helped to encourage the growth of the 
middle class, which plays an important role in these protests. Both ENGOs and groups of 
protesters are part of China’s larger environmental movement, which is at the core of the 
emergence of a “green public sphere” that is home to an environmental discourse that involves 
both political debates and public engagement.  As of the year 2012, the number of 44
environmental protests taking place had risen by 29% each year.  ENGOs should be given some 45
amount of credit for contributing to this phenomenon, as environmental education and the 
promotion of public participation has been a focus of many groups.  ENGOs have also furthered 46
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the environmental cause in the eyes of the Chinese state, potentially allowing protests to emerge 
in the manner that they have. The growth of technology in China has played a vital role in 
supporting both ENGOs and protests. ENGOs use the internet to organize, communicate, and 
spread information.  As we will see, protesters use text messages and social media to spread the 47
word about demonstrations.  
The emergence of confrontational tactics can be seen as the result of growing 
environmental awareness among members of the middle class and a lack of appropriate 
government response. This is illustrated by 6 high-profile instances of environmental protest 
which took place in the cities of Xiamen, Guangzhou, Dalian, Shifang, Ningbo, and Kunming. 
“Strolling” in Xiamen 
 In 2007, protests against the construction of a paraxylene (PX) plant by the company 
Xianglu took place in the city of Xiamen, Fujian province. The response of Xiamen’s citizens to 
this environmental threat quickly became a catalyst for China’s debate over the safety of PX and 
an inspiration for later protests, some of which also involved PX.  The story of the Xiamen case 48
involves Xianglu, local officials, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the 
central government, and most importantly, the citizens of Xiamen.  
Jonathan Ansfield provides a detailed narrative of the events which transpired before, 
during, and after the protests that helps place them in a broader context. He describes Haicang, 
the district of Xiamen where the PX plant was to be built, as an area populated by “white-collar 
migrants who once flocked to Haicang for sea views and sweet breezes.” These citizens became 
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fed up with the smells coming from the local wastewater treatment plant and the existing 
Xianglu chemical plant, voicing their disgust on online forums. These forums quickly became a 
venue for disapproval over the PX addition, and spawned an effort to crowdsource research on 
the environmental risks of the proposed plant. The residents also attempted to voice their 
concerns to the relevant authorities. They were unable to get any response from the local 
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), the district government, or the mayor’s office. 
Consequently, they tried to communicate with the State Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA) and the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), the entities in charge of 
giving approval for the PX project. They discovered that they were too late, as the project had 
been approved before their letters reached their destinations.  49
 The citizens’ plight was recognized by Ma Tiannan, the founder of Green Cross, 
Xiamen’s first ENGO. But even with her connections to the head of Xiamen’s EPB, she was still 
unable to make any progress on the matter.  Zhao Yufen, a Xiamen University professor and 50
member of the China People’s Political Consultative Conference, also took up the cause. Using 
her political status, she was able to take the case for the relocation of the PX plant all the way to 
Beijing. However, Zhao and her colleagues exaggerated the possible negative effects of PX in 
their arguments, which provided an easy response for those opposing their efforts.  Zhao was 51
also informed by an NDRC official that new development, including the construction of a 




the proposed PX plant. The environmental approval had already taken place, and she was unable 
to gain access to a copy of the report.  With few other choices, Xiameners took to the internet 52
once again. Blogs and comments sections filled with statements opposing PX and local officials 
and calling for protests. This spread among residents through text messages as well, such as the 
message at beginning of this article which called for demonstrations on June 1, 2007. The 
protests were referred to as “collective strolls” in order to avoid government censorship.  53
 It is estimated that between 300 and 600 people initially gathered at the Xiamen city 
government offices to demonstrate.  The protest swelled as the day went on, and People’s Daily 54
reported on August 4 of 2009 that the protesters eventually numbered around ten thousand.  The 55
event was covered by bloggers who were present, documenting chants of “reject pollution, 
protect Xiamen!” and banners such as “resist PX, protect Egret Island.”  The demonstrations 56
continued for a second day before they were declared illegal by the local police, who called for 
the gathering to cease. It began to rain, and the protests were over by the second evening.  57
 It is interesting to note the response of Xiamen Green Cross, the aforementioned ENGO, 
to the demonstrations. After protesters began to post pictures and information from the protest to 
its website, Ma Tianan, the leader of Xiamen Green Cross, was pressured by the authorities to 
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responsibility for organizing the protests.  When confronted with this level of monitoring, she 58
had no choice but to comply. Later, she and her organization would be attacked by other activists 
for their neutrality during the protests.  This illustrates one of the ways that ENGOs are 59
somewhat limited in their activities, creating space for protests to emerge independently. 
Guangzhou 
Two years after the Xiamen protests, another widely reported protest took place, this time 
over a garbage incinerator in Panyu District, Guangzhou, Guangdong province. The facility, 
which would process two thousand tons of waste per day, was planned as part of an effort to deal 
with the area’s growing needs. However, after residents learned that cancer rates had gone up in 
the nearby village of Likeng after the construction of a similar incinerator, they began to mount 
an opposition to it.  Accounts seem to indicate that the organizers of the protest were peasants 60
living in the immediate vicinity of the construction site, but large numbers of middle-class 
residents quickly joined in, blocking the road to the offices of the municipal government.  The 61
protesters eventually entered the offices, then held a peaceful demonstration in the city square.  62
More than 1,000 Guangzhou residents are believed to have participated after pictures and 
information were posted online through Weibo and illegally on Twitter.  63
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Those who participated did so for a few reasons. The residents of luxury housing 
complexes close to the construction site were particularly worried that the incinerator would not 
only release carcinogenic emissions, but also negatively affect their property values.  The 64
protests also point to an even larger concern: dissatisfaction with the lack of consultation in the 
decision-making process. This reflects the public’s growing distrust of and frustration with the 
government.  “The government told us there won't be any pollution, but we don't believe them,” 
said a woman who gave only the surname Ou. “At least today the government have heard the 
voice of the people. They can't pretend that they are deaf and mute anymore."  The people of 65
Guangzhou also demonstrated the increasing environmental awareness of Chinese citizens. 
According to a Guangdong provincial social research and study center public opinion poll, 
“nearly 92% of residents believe the project will seriously harm their health and the 
environment, while more than 97% oppose construction of the plant.”  66
Dalian 
 In 2011, two years after the Guangzhou garbage incinerator protests, a demonstration 
occurred in Dalian that surpassed even the numbers seen in Xiamen. The events were the result 
of fears that the damage done to Dalian’s dikes by Tropical Storm Muifa could cause leaks from 
the Fujia PX plant, located on the coast.  According to one Dalian resident, an online message 67
asked citizens to “stroll” on the People’s square, the same terminology used in Xiamen to call for 
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protest while dodging China’s censors. Further use of social media to spread the word resulted in 
a demonstration by an estimated 12,000 people, who demanded that the PX plant be moved. 
Other accounts suggest that the number of people involved may have been as high as seventy 
thousand.  As reported in Reuters, “protesters including children marched holding banners that 68
declared: ‘I love Dalian and reject poison,’ ‘return me my home and garden, get out PX, protect 
Dalian,’ and ‘Return my future generations' beautiful home,’ according to eyewitness accounts.” 
The plant was ordered to shut down in response, and the authorities made a pledge to move the 
plant, although no timetable was given.  69
 The Dalian protest bears some important similarities to the two previously discussed 
protests. First, it reflected a distrust of those in charge. Although the local government insisted 
that no chemical leaks had taken place as a result of the tropical storm, the public was not so 
easily persuaded. Second, significant numbers of middle-class citizens were involved. As Meg 
Rithmire noted on The China Beat on August 15, 2011, Dalian is home to many middle and 
upper-class Chinese and is considered a very desirable place to live. This privileged position is 
what allowed them to not only express concern over the state of their environment, but also to 
protest in an effort to improve it. 
Shifang 
 While the “mass incidents” in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Dalian were relatively peaceful, 
demonstrations against the construction of a molybdenum-copper alloy plant in Shifang in 
Sichuan Province resulted in clashes with police in the summer of 2012. Tens of thousands of 
 Jonathan Watts, “China orders petrochemical plant shutdown after protests,” The Guardian, August 14, 2011.68
 Sui-Lee Wee, “China says will shut plant as thousands protest,” Reuters, August 14, 2011.69
citizens were involved in three days of protests before the government agreed to cancel the 
construction in Shifang. Thousands of riot police attempted to disperse the demonstrators after 
they entered the headquarters of the city government and smashed police cars. Tear gas was used, 
and reports indicate that at least thirteen people sustained injuries in clashes with riot police. The 
government also threatened that any protest organizers who did not surrender within three days 
would be “severely punished.”  70
 The Shifang demonstrations are another example of citizens’ dissatisfaction with their 
government. As they become more affluent, they desire greater voice than what is available to 
them. Reports indicate that residents of Shifang had already filed complaints opposing the copper 
plant, but to no avail. No public hearings took place, and the environmental report on the 
proposed plant was released without the inclusion of information on solid waste and waste 
water.  Oversights such as these contributed to the public’s distrust of authority. 71
Ningbo 
 Concern over PX emerged once again in late 2012 when citizens of Ningbo, Zhejiang 
Province took to the streets. A plan to expand a local chemical plant resulted in three days of 
protest by urban, middle-class residents of Ningbo.  Following the example of previous 72
incidents in Xiamen and Dalian, the internet and social media were used to learn about the 
dangers of PX as well as to organize the protests. Stories about contamination of nearby areas 
sometimes become calls to action for urban activists, as was the case in Ningbo. Protesters were 
 Sui-Lee Wee and Ben Blanchard, “China city scraps alloy plant after protests,” Reuters, July 3, 2012.70
 Tania Branigan, “Anti-pollution protesters halt construction of copper plant in China,” The Guardian, July 3, 71
2012.
 Sophie Beach, “Ningbo Protests Point to Middle Class Discontent,” China Digital Times, October 29, 2012.72
also aware of the mixed success of the activists in whose footsteps they followed; even after 
local authorities promised to stop the expansion of the plant, they continued to protest out of pure 
suspicion and lack of trust in their government.  73
 A statement made by a resident of Ningbo who was involved in the protest perfectly 
captures both peoples’ environmental awareness stemming from affluence and their 
dissatisfaction with the government:  
                                                                                                                                     
“It is said that this project would bring a large increase in GDP—which may be a 
 good thing for the city. But we believe it will pollute the soil we live on, the 
water we drink, the food we eat, and the air we breathe. We’d just love to have a 
clean place to live and to preserve it for the later generations. We aren’t so 
concerned about how much money the project brings because we are already 
satisfied with the current economic situation. We don’t trust the treatment 
techniques to reduce emissions or the official ‘assessment’ of the pollution 
impact.”  74
These two factors, combined with the increasing prevalence of the internet and the use of social 
media, creates a situation where citizens see protests as a potential method of addressing their 
concerns. 
Kunming 
 Kunming, Yunnan Province, was the site of two separate protests in May of 2013. The 
first, in much the same vein as those in Xiamen, Dalian, and Ningbo, was against the 
construction of a PX plant within the city. Organizers used social media to spread the word about 
a “civil march” in Nanping Square, which eventually attracted around two thousand participants. 
The Kunming protest is particularly notable for its high level of organization. Four “teach-in 
 Christina Larson, “Protests in China Get a Boost From Social Media,” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 29, 73
2012.
 Ibid.74
zones” within Nanping Square were set up, featuring speakers who tried to educate attendees 
about the dangers of PX. Discussions were also held over an issue that should be familiar by 
now: the disconnect between the government’s environmental approval process and the 
concerned public. Although roughly two hundred police officers were present, no arrests or other 
conflicts with protesters took place.  Two weeks later, activists took to the streets once again, 75
this time in front of the headquarters of the provincial government, rather than in a public square. 
One protester was arrested by plainclothes police, after which the police showed less and less 
opposition to the crowds, which eventually swelled to an estimated 2,500 individuals. Their 
initial target was the same PX project from two weeks prior, but over time the protest expanded 
to include opposition to the construction of a PetroChina oil refinery in Kunming. Late in the 
afternoon, the city’s mayor addressed the crowd in person. He promised greater transparency 
through the use of a Sina Weibo account and a public hearing on the matter.  76
 The Kunming protest provides us with another example of the general public’s frustration 
with their government over the lack of environmental transparency. This is a reality that even the 
mayor of Kunming understood when he confronted the demonstrators. As part of his effort to 
appease them, he seemed to suggest that in the future the public would be more involved in the 
decision-making process regarding the oil refinery and that the environmental impact 
assessments would finally be released.  77
The Rise of Middle Class Protest 
 “Anatomy of a Protest: Kunming citizens voice concern over chemical plant,” East by Southeast Blog, May 6, 75
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17, 2013.
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 The examples of environmental protest given here show a significant amount of middle-
class involvement as well as a desire to present complaints directly to the relevant authorities. 
This shift in the environmental movement is the result of two factors: a significant increase in 
middle class environmental awareness and the failure of the government to respond appropriately 
to the demands of environmentally-aware middle class Chinese. According to a Pew Research 
Global Attitudes Project survey, 47% of the Chinese public considers air pollution to be a big 
problem, up from 36% just one year previously. Similarly, 40% consider water pollution a big 
problem, up from 33%.  This increase in middle class environmental awareness is particularly 78
important given the special attention the government pays to the urban middle and upper classes 
as opposed to rural peasants. As these populations grow, the government has a vested interest in 
keeping them satisfied as a means to maintain social stability. It can often afford to ignore low 
income groups because of their lack of knowledge and resources.  Media attention is also 79
consistently biased against the country’s rural population for political reasons.  Thousands of 80
demonstrations occur across China every year, but only those which are politically safe and 
involve citizens deemed more important become widely reported on, or have any hope of 
achieving a favorable response. 
The current environmental protection system does not function at the speed demanded by 
environmentally-aware middle class Chinese. According to a survey of residents of 34 cities by 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Public Opinion Research Center, almost 80% of China’s people 
 “Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, September 19, 2013.78
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consider environmental protection to be more important than economic development. Not only 
that, over 60% indicated that there is a lack of transparency in the government’s environmental 
protection information.  Protests often are set off by frustration over the lack of transparency 81
and public consultation that defines the Chinese system. Although the state has an interest in 
improving the environmental situation, it would prefer to do so in a way that maintains its 
control and political stability. ENGOs have in many cases been a tool for accomplishing this. 
While the state sees NGOs as a partner in some cases, it has not hesitated to repress their 
activities when it sees fit.  82
Conclusion 
The emergence of directly confrontational protests bolstered by significant middle class 
support represents a shift in the Chinese environmental movement as a whole. These protests 
have emerged as the result of the growing level of middle class environmental consciousness as 
well as the inadequacy of the government’s response to serious environmental issues. This is 
particularly evident in the public’s frustration over the lack of government transparency and 
public consultation. While this shift is in one sense a challenge for ENGOs, it also represents the 
maturation and growth of Chinese environmentalism. While ENGOs are no longer the sole actors 
driving Chinese environmentalism, they still have an important role to play. Protests may be an 
effective means of gaining the attention of the state, but they lack the connections and 
embeddedness that allow ENGOs to influence policy. It may be some time before social 
organizations are willing to link themselves to large-scale protests, but they must learn to take 
 “Survey: Govt needs to focus more on environment,” China Daily, May 8, 2013.81
 Anthony J. Spires, “Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival 82
of China’s Grassroots NGOs,” American Journal of Sociology 117 (2011), 22.
advantage of the energy and public interest they create. There is some hope that ENGOs and 
other groups will find success as part of China’s growing non-profit sector, supported by the 
expansion of philanthropy that has resulted from the country’s growing wealth.  Protesters could 83
also benefit greatly from the established networks and organizational abilities of ENGOs, giving 
them new tools with which to accomplish their goals. Cooperation between these two groups 
would require significant risk-taking, especially on the part of ENGOs, but a partnership is 
necessary to create a united front that can work towards solutions to China’s dire environmental 
problems. 
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